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RECIDIVIST PROCEDURES: PREJUDICE AND DUE PROCESS
Our system of criminal justice is grounded in the notion that a
man shall be tried only for the particular offense with which he is
charged. Justice must be blind to his character, position, and prior
conduct. But such impartiality cannot be achieved when the trier of
fact knows of an accused's criminal record. Thus, in a recidivist pro-
ceeding, when a habitual offender's prior convictions are considered
in sentencing, care must be taken to insure that prior crimes affect
only the sentence, not the determination of guilt.
Since their inception, recidivist statutes and procedures have
weathered constitutional attacks ranging from double jeopardy and
cruel and unusual punishment to lack of notice and opportunity to
be heard.' The most dangerous threat to constitutional rights arises
when a jury learns of the defendant's record before determining his
guilt. In Spencer v. Texas,2 the Supreme Court reviewed the Texas
recidivist procedure, 3 which permitted the prosecutor to introduce evi-
dence of the defendant's prior convictions before the determination of
guilt, thereby allowing simultaneous jury consideration of the issues
of guilt and recidivism.4 A closely divided Court found the procedure
not sufficiently prejudicial to violate due process. 5
I E.g., Oyler v. Boles, 868 U.S. 448 (1962) (notice and opportunity to be heard);
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (right to counsel, double jeopardy, and ex post
facto); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (due process, double jeopardy, equal
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311
(1901) (double jeopardy, ex post facto, and cruel and unusual punishment); Moore v.
Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895) (double jeopardy).
2 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
3 TEx. PEN. CoDE ANN. arts. 62-64 (1952). Whether the defendant had the right to
stipulate and thus keep the prejudicial evidence from being admitted is discussed in
Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion. 385 U.S. at 579-82. The stipulation procedure
is described at p. 341 infra. Texas has since changed this law. The new statute,
effective January 1, 1966, and therefore not applicable to Spencer, provides that the
recidivist issue will not be submitted to the jury until guilt is found. Tax. CoDE CR m.
PRoc. ANN. art. 36.01 (1965). Although Texas has changed its procedure, the question
remains important, because 16 other states use procedures similar to the old Texas pro-
cedure. See note 19 infra.
4 When the recidivism charge is contested, the issues for the jury are the existence
of past convictions and the identity of the defendant. See Note, Methods of Proving
Previous Convictions Under the Iowa OMVI and Habitual Criminal Statutes, 39 IowA
L. REv. 156 (1953); Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 332 (1965); Note, The
Pleading and Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Criminal Prosecutions, 33 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 210, 212 n.19 (1958). If the jury finds that the defendant has previously been con-
victed, it then assesses the increased recidivist punishment, as in Spencer. 385 U.S. at 557.
5 Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court was joined by four other Justices, including
Justice Stewart, who also wrote a concurring opinion. The Court concluded that the
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Most courts and commentators recognize that information, about
prior convictions prejudices the defendant to some extent.6 the seri-
ousness of the effects, however, is widely disputed. Evidence of prior
convictions might negate the presumption of innocence normally
accorded a criminal defendant3 A jury might confuse the issues of
guilt and recidivism, and convict the defendant merely because he
appears to be a "bad man"; the result would be to strip the defendant
of his right to be tried only for the present offense. By taking the past
convictions to show a criminal propensity, the jury would be more
likely to convict the defendant on insufficient evidence.8
The Spencer Court concluded that the validity of the state's pur-
pose in introducing evidence of prior convictions outweighs the preju-
dice to the defendant.9 If the evidence is admitted, the prejudice is
diminished by the judge's instructions directing the jury to disregard
possibility of prejudice was not sufficient to render the procedure unconstitutional when
weighed against the valid state purpose and widespread use. Justice Stewart thought
the procedure significantly inferior to more recent statutes, including the Texas revision,
supra note 3, but not below due process standards. Chief Justice Warren, joined by
three other Justices in his dissenting opinion, found the prejudice needless and the
procedure "fundamentally at odds with traditional notions of due process." 385 U.S. at
570. For an analysis of these opinions and the case in general, see Note, Constitutional
Law: Supreme Court Indicates Significant Limitation upon Review of State Criminal
Procedures, 1967 DUKE L.J. 857.
6 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 476 (1948); Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963); United States ex rel.
Scholeri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954);
F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 232 (12th ed. 1955); J. WMoRE, EvIDENCE §§ 193-94,
196 (3d ed. 1940); Comment, Prejudicial Evidence Under the Illinois Habitual Criminal
Act, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 742 (1954); Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balanc-
ing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961). But see Note, Procedural Protections of
the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and
the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity To Commit Crime, 78 HARv. L. Rlv. 426,
435-45, 449-51 (1964).
In Spencer, the majority recognized the prejudice, but believed "the conceded pos-
sibility of prejudice ... to be outweighed by the validity of the State's purpose in permit-
ting introduction of the evidence." 385 U.S. at 561.
7 See Comment, Prejudicial Evidence Under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act, 48
Nw. U.L. REv. 742, 744 (1954).
8 A recent study of jury behavior indicates that the defendant's record does have a
definite prejudicial effect in close cases.
The jury's broad rule of thumb here, presumably, is that as a matter of
human experience it is especially unlikely that a person with no prior record
will commit a serious crime, and that this is relevant to evaluating his testimony
when he denies his guilt on the stand. As to him, the presumption of innocence
has special force. In contrast, defendants with records . . . evoke a different jury
calculus of probabilities . ...
H. KALVEN & H. ZEisFL, TnE AMERICAN JURY 179 (1966).
9 385 U.S. at 561.
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the evidence for all purposes except that of fixing the sentence. More-
over, the defendant is protected by the trial court's discretion to ex-
clude the evidence. Finally, the convenience of a single proceeding
weighs heavily against further limiting prejudice by resorting to cum-
bersome alternative procedures. The Court concluded that, although
the Texas procedure may be somewhat prejudicial, it is not unconstitu-
tional.
In the face of the legitimate state purpose and the long-standing
and widespread use that attend the procedure under attack here,
we find it impossible to say that because of the possibility of some
collateral prejudice the Texas procedure is rendered unconsti-
tutional under the Due Process Clause as it has been interpreted
and applied in our past cases.10
I
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS
It is a well-estabished general rule that evidence of prior crimes
or convictions is inadmissible in a criminal trial to show probability
of guilt or propensity for criminal behavior.1 But such evidence may,
of course, come in for other purposes.' 2 Since the rationale of admit-
ting the evidence in such circumstances is that it serves a valid and
necessary purpose in the determination of guilt, the exceptions are
continually tempered by balancing the necessity, value, and purpose of
the evidence against its prejudicial effect. For example, a past convic-
tion might be used to impeach the defendant's testimony after he has
taken the stand.13 This evidence is relevant to the jury's determination
10 Id. at 564.
11 C. McCoRmICK, supra note 6, § 157; F. WHARTON, supra note 6, § 232; J. WiG-
MoRE, supra note 6, § 57. Both evidence of prior convictions and evidence of prior crimes
(the act itself for which the defendant has not been prosecuted) are included in this
general exclusionary rule. This Note, however, only concerns evidence of prior convic-
tions, since crimes for which there was no conviction cannot be used to prove a habitual
offender charge.
12 The evidence is admissible when it is material in proving the intent, scienter,
malice, motive, or identity of the defendant, in establishing a scheme of crime by the
defendant, and in showing a passion for sex crimes, or when it is used to impeach the
defendant's credibility when he takes the stand or impugn his character after he first
puts his character in issue. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §§ 43, 157; F. WHARTON, supra
note 6, §§ 233-43, 892, 946; J. WiGMORuE, supra note 6, §§ 58, 193-94, 196. There has been
much written criticizing these exceptions and commenting on when they are justified.
See, e.g., materials cited note 6 supra; Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41
IowA L. REv. 325 (1956); Note, Use of Prior Crimes To Affect Credibility and Penalty in
Pennsylvania, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 382 (1965); Note, Admissibility in Criminal Prosecutions
of Proof of Other Offenses as Substantive Evidence, 3 VAND. L. RFv. 779 (1950).
13 E.g., Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 167 Pa. Super. 79, 86, 74 A.2d 750, 754 (1950);
Commonwealth v. Gold, 155 Pa. Super. 364, 371, 38 A.2d 486, 489 (1944).
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of the defendant's credibility and the weight to be given to his testi-
mony. In a recidivist proceeding, however, evidence of past convictions
has no bearing on any element of the crime in question or on the issue
of guilt.
If the Spencer Court had applied the rationale of the prior con-
victions rule instead of looking to the minimum standards of due
process, the result might have been different.' 4 Evidence of prior con-
victions is admitted to punish habitual offenders more severely; this
probably constitutes a legitimate state purpose. Although the conveni-
ence of a one-step procedure is a valid reason for admitting the evi-
dence during the principal trial, serious prejudice may result. Instruc-
tions that the jury limit its consideration of this evidence to its
determination of the issue of recidivism do not completely counteract
the damage done.15 At this point the state's purpose might outweigh
the prejudice. When a simple alternative procedure is available, how-
ever, the prejudice becomes needless and should outweigh the con-
venience factor.16
II
ALTERNATIVE RECIDIVIST PROCEDURES
There are five basic recidivist trial procedures each having minor
variations.17 In choosing the best procedure for the admission of recid-
ivist evidence, prejudice, adequate notice, efficiency, and the funda-
mental rights of the defendant are relevant considerations.'8
A. Texas Procedure
Under the Texas procedure, held constitutional in Spencer, evi-
dence of prior convictions is submitted to the jury before the determi-
14 The Court must, of course, apply constitutional standards rather than its own
ideas of what is "best." See note 25 infra.
15 "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions
to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949). This is a disputed point. See Note, Criminal Law:
Second Circuit Holds Cautionary Instructions Insufficient To Cure Potential Prejudice
Resulting from Admission of Co-Conspirator's Confession, 1967 DuKE L.J. 202 (concluding
that prejudice becomes grounds for reversal as function of importance of confession
to prosecution's case); Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51
MINN. L. Rsv. 264 (1966) (concluding that instructions are ineffective).
16 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 579-80 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
17 For classification and evaluation of the various state procedures, see Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 586-87, nn. 10-12 (1967) (dissenting opinion); Note, Constitutional
Law: Supreme Court Indicates Significant Limitation upon Review of State Criminal
Procedures, 1967 Dunc L.J. 857, 859-62; Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv.
332, 333-34 (1965); Note, The Pleading and Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Crim-
inal Prosecutions, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 210 (1958).
18 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567 (1967).
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nation of guilt. The indictment gives notice to the defendant of the
recidivism charge as well as of the principal offense. Because it is the
most expeditious method, the Texas procedure appeals to jurisdictions
with crowded court calendars. Although it does provide a jury deter-
mination of all issues, the procedure causes serious prejudice to the
defendant. 19
B. Stipulation Procedure
In several states, if the defendant stipulates to or admits the prior
offenses charged in the indictment, evidence of them is not submitted
to the jury.20 Thus, when the recidivism issue is uncontested, the trial
proceedings are faster than under the Texas procedure. If the issue is
contested, however, evidence of past convictions goes to the jury dur-
ing trial, and the prejudice to the defendant is the same as under the
Texas procedure. Moreover, the defendant is faced with a choice be-
tween two undesirable alternatives. He must either stipulate away the
right to challenge the prior convictions or have the prejudicial evi-
dence of the convictions admitted during the trial. Even when the de-
fendant's prior convictions are of questionable validity, evidence of
them is bound to be prejudicial on the question of guilt. The stipula-
tion technique adds little to the undesirable Texas procedure.
C. Judicial Determination
Although submitting the issue of recidivism to the court after the
jury has reached a verdict of guilty eliminates the problem of preju-
dice, it also deprives the defendant of a jury trial on the issue.21 More-
over, separate determination of guilt and recidivism involves two hear-
ings and therefore sacrifices some of the efficiency of the Texas proce-
dure.
19 See pp. 337-39 supra. This is the common law procedure once used by a majority
of the states, but now by only 16. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 587 (dissenting opinion).
See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2208 (1956); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431-190 (Supp. 1963).
20 This procedure, a variation of the common law procedure, was used in Texas to
some extent prior to Spencer. Whether an absolute right to stipulate existed in Texas
and whether the defendants in Spencer had that right is discussed in Chief Justice
Warren's dissenting opinion. 385 U.S. at 580-82. He concluded that the stipulation pro-
cedure was applied inconsistently in that state and that the defendants in Spencer were
either denied the right or not 'offered it. Some states expressly provide for stipulation.
See, e.g., AsIz. R. CpuM. PRoc. 180 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1025 (West 1956). In others
the right to stipulate grew out of case law. E.g., Howard v. State, 139 Wis. 529, 533, 121
N.W. 133, 135 (1909).
21 Only a few states permit the judge without a jury to determine the issue of
reddivism. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.16(3) (1964); Na3. R v. STAT. § 29-2221(2)
(1964).
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D. Separate Trials
Separate jury trials also eliminate prejudice in determining guilt,
but the procedure is inefficient, involving two separate juries and two
separate hearings, one for the determination of guilt, and one for the
determination of recidivism. Since two trials involve the use of separate
indictments, the defendant is not ordinarily notified of the recidivism
charge until after the first trial. Notice of the recidivism charge before
trial can be vital;22 it may drastically affect not only the tenor of the
defense at trial but also the decision to plead guilty or not guilty.
E. Two-Stage Trial
The two-stage trial combines the advantages of stipulation and
separate trials without sacrificing efficiency.2 3 It also provides a jury
determination of the issue of recidivism. A two-part indictment con-
tains allegations of both charges, thus giving adequate notice to the
defendant. The recidivism section is not read to the jury unless and
until the defendant is found guilty of the principal charge. Since evi-
dence of past convictions is introduced and contested only at this
point, it does not prejudicially influence the determination of guilt.
Although the procedure entails two deliberations by the same jury, it
is much less time-consuming than the separate trial system, which re-
quires two juries. The proceedings are often abbreviated; if the de-
fendant is found not guilty of the principal charge, the recidivism issue
is eliminated altogether, and if the defendant stipulates to the prior
convictions, no evidence of them need be presented. Because the two-
stage trial combines efficiency, adequate notice, lack of prejudice, and
due regard for the right to a jury trial, most authorities agree that it
is the most desirable procedure.24 Other procedures may, however,
22 Lack of notice of the recidivism charge before trial may be unconstitutional.
United States ex rel. Collins v. Claudy, 204 F.2d 624 (Sd Cir. 1953) (lack of notice that
sentence would be under recidivist statute held to violate procedural due process). Oyler
v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), upheld the constitutionality of giving notice of the recidivist
charge after the first trial. The Court considered it significant to its decision that the
defendant had counsel in the first trial. For examples of this separate trial procedure,
see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.11 (1965); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1085 (1954); OHio RaV.
CODE ANN. § 2961.13 (Page 1954).
23 The first procedure of this type was established in England by the Coinage
Offence Act, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 99 (1861). The first American jurisdiction to adopt this
procedure was Connecticut in State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452 (1921).
24 See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567 (1967). See also id. at 585-86 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting); Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179, 186 (4th Cir. 1963); Note, Constitutional
Law: Supreme Court Indicates Significant Limitation upon Review of State Criminal
Procedures, 1967 DUKE L.J. 857, 860-61; Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv.
[Vol. 53:337
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meet the minimum standards of fairness required by due process.25
III
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Prior to Spencer the Fourth Circuit held a Texas-type recidivist
procedure too prejudicial to meet the minimum fairness requirement
of due process.26 The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, approved a sim-
ilar procedure on the ground that it satisfied due process standards.2
The Third Circuit held unconstitutional Pennsylvania's procedure in
capital cases, under which evidence of prior convictions was admitted
during the trial but only for the purpose of sentencing.28 The court
concluded that since the risk of prejudice takes on special significance
in a capital case,29 due process required separate determination of guilt
and punishment and exclusion of the defendant's criminal record until
after a guilty verdict.30
In Marshall v. United States,31 the Supreme Court recognized the
serious danger of prejudice where the jury discovers the defendant's past
convictions. The jurors learned of the defendant's record during the
trial through newspaper articles. The Court ordered a new trial, ob-
serving that "[t]he prejudice to the defendant is almost certain to be as
great when that evidence reaches the jury through news accounts as
when it is a part of the prosecution's evidence. ' 2 The decision, how-
ever, was not constitutionally based; it merely announced a procedural
rule for federal courts, the minimum standards for which are ap-
parently stricter than those of due process. When compared with Jack-
son v. Denno3 3 and the recent landmark decisions involving the rights
of the accused,3 4 Marshall demonstrates the Court's distinction between
332, 348 (1965); Note, The Pleading and Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Crim-
inal Prosecutions, 33 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 210, 216 (1958).
25 As Justice Cardozo explained, a state "procedure does not run foul of the Four-
teenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or
wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar." Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
26 Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
27 Breen v. Beto, 341 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 926 (1967).
28 United States ex rel. Scholeri v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1962).
29 Id. at 724.
30 Id. at 725 (by implication).
31 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
32 Id. at 312-13. In Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1948)othe Court
expressed concern over the use of evidence of prior convictions, maintaining that the
misuse of the practice must be scrupulously guarded against.
33 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
34 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
1968]
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rules of criminal procedure for federal trials and due process require-
ments for the states. In Ker v. California,3 5 the Court pointed out:
[A]lthough the standard of reasonableness is the same under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the demands of our federal
system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inadmis-
sible because of our supervisory powers over federal courts and
that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United States
Constitution.36
The decisions of the courts of appeals in the recidivism cases demon-
strate a misunderstanding of this distinction; they depend on federal
trial procedure cases37 as precedents to solve due process problems in
state procedures.
A. Spencer's Similarity to Jackson v. Denno
Some light is thrown on the decision in Spencer by comparing
it with Jackson v. Denno.3s In Jackson, the Court held that simul-
taneous submission to the jury of the question of guilt and the
issue of voluntariness of a confession would not result in a reliable de-
termination of the issue of voluntariness and was therefore so prejudi-
cial to the defendant's rights as to violate due process. Jackson and
Spencer are remarkably similar. In Jackson jury confusion of two
issues, guilt and voluntariness of a confession, was possible. Since the
jury considered both simultaneously, the issue of voluntariness could
easily influence the determination of guilt, and vice-versa. Alternative
nonprejudicial procedures were available,39 but the procedure in
question was the most commonly used.40 Defendant's right to a jury
trial on all questions of fact and the desirability of using split proce-
dures or two juries were also involved. The Jackson Court held that the
(1965); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
36 Id. at 33.
37 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Michelson v. United States, 335
U.S. 469 (1948).
38 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
39 The orthodox rule is that the trial judge "solely and finally determines the volun-
tariness of the confession .... " 378 U.S. at 378. The so-called Massachusetts procedure
gives the trial judge authority to screen out what he finds to be involuntary confessions,
letting the jury then pass separately on the voluntary nature of those which he feels
were indeed voluntary.
40 The procedure had been approved by the Supreme Court in Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156 (1953). Stein was overruled by Jackson v. Denno. See 378 U.S. at 396-400
(appendix) and 378 U.S. at 410-23 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
for a survey of procedures followed by various state and federal jurisdictions.
[Vol. 53:337
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Constitution requires separate determinations of the two potentially
confusing issues.
Jackson's position . . . is that the issue of his confession should
not have been decided by the convicting jury but should have
been determined in a proceeding separate and apart from the
body trying guilt or innocence. So far we agree and hold that he
is now entitled to such a hearing in the state court.41
What is the significant difference between the procedures in Jackson
and Spencer that makes one constitutional while the other is not?
B. Due Process and Prejudicial Criminal Procedure
The complete answer does not lie in the degree of prejudice re-
sulting from each procedure.42 Nor is it likely that the Court in the
three years between the two decisions acquired a new faith in the
jury's ability to handle confusing and prejudicial issues simultaneously.
The distinction between Jackson and Spencer is not in the procedures
used, resulting prejudice, or judicial attitude toward juries; rather, it
is attributable to a difference in the constitutional rights at issue. In
Spencer Justice Harlan explained:
[T]he emphasis [in Jackson] was on protection of a specific con-
stitutional right, and the Jackson procedure was designed as a
specific remedy to ensure that an involuntary confession was not
in fact relied upon by the jury. In the procedures before us, in
contrast, no specific federal right-such as that dealing with con-
fessions-is involved; reliance is placed solely on a general "fair-
ness" approach. 43
The defendant in Jackson availed himself of the specific federal protec-
tion against the admissibility of a coerced confession. In Spencer the
defendant could rely only on the general "fairness" protection of the
due process clause.44 Whereas the Court enforces specific rights with
413 78 U.S. at 394.
42 Jackson and Spencer are arguably distinguishable on the relative degree of preju-
dice involved. The confession before the jury in Jackson was more directly related to
the issue of guilt than was the recidivism in Spencer; therefore, it might have been more
difficult for the jury in Jackson to separate the question of voluntariness and guilt.
43 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 565 (1967).
44 It might be argued that the procedure in Spencer did violate a specific right-
the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. The Court has construed this right to
require impartial jury selection, United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936) (holding that
government employees may be jurors in District of Columbia criminal cases unless re-
moved for cause), and to prohibit outside prejudicial or disruptive influences on the
jury, such as trial publicity or an influential bailiff. E.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 US.
363 (1966) (bailiff impressed upon the jury his opinion of the defendant's guilt); Baker v.
Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942) (jury misconduct
outside the trial and qualification of jurors). But the right to an impartial jury has never
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particular care, the states retain a greater latitude in satisfying the fair-
ness requirements of due process. "In this area the Court has always
moved with caution before striking down state procedures." 45
Although Jackson was expressly decided on fourteenth amend-
ment due process grounds, the right to a trial free from the taint of a
coerced confession has been so long recognized and so strictly guarded
that it may be as "specific" as the rights contained in the first eight
amendments. Moreover, the rule excluding involuntary confessions
was at the time of Jackson very closely related to, if not in fact based
on, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Justice
Harlan's distinction in Spencer is quite elusive. If a "specific right" is
one that is well-established and rigorously protected, then the distinc-
tion begs the question, since the issue is whether the right involved
should be rigorously enforced. On the other hand, the distinction may
have merit if "specific federal right" refers to a right that is either
enumerated in the first eight amendments or closely related to a right
so enumerated.
Prior to 1964, cases involving confessions in state trials were de-
cided on the basis of voluntariness and were grounded in due process
rather than self-incrimination. 46 As a result, the standards of admissi-
bility in federal and state trials differed, at least in theory.47 .Malloy v.
Hogan,48 decided one week before Jackson, indicated that the differ-
ence was minimal. Holding that the fifth amendment applies to the
states through the fourteenth, the Court explained:
[T]oday the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal prose-
been used to exclude prejudicial evidence. Although this right could provide the Court
with a tool for establishing stricter constitutional rules of evidence, its meaning is appar-
ently so well established that the dissenters in Spencer did not even raise the issue.
The natural meaning of "impartial" connotes absence of preconceived bias, and since
the purpose of presenting any evidence is to sway the jury, basing the admissibility of
evidence on the impartiality requirement would make very little sense. The right to an
impartial jury properly extends only to matters affecting initial jury impartiality or
affecting the jury from outside the trial or courtroom itself.
45 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 565 (1967).
46 The rule excluding involuntary confessions was originally a rule of evidence,
experience having proven involuntary confessions unreliable. See Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908). In Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the Court established
a constitutional basis for the rule, prohibiting, as a violation of due process, a state's use
of an involuntray confession in a criminal trial. The Court there expressly distinguished
this right from the privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 285, presumably because
of the holding in Twining that the fifth amendment does not apply to the states.
47 Some states actually used the federal test of voluntariness, while others emphasized
the conduct, coercion, and brutality of the officials procuring the confession.
- 48 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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cution is tested by the same standard applied in federal prosecu-
tions . . . "the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth
Amendment... commanding that no person 'shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' 49
The Court continued: "The shift reflects recognition that the Amer-
ican system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial,
and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.$5 0
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the Court applied the Malloy language52
to a confession case, remarking:
Aside from the holding itself, the reasoning in Malloy made clear
what had already become apparent-that the substantive and
procedural safeguards surrounding admissibility of confessions in
state cases had become exceedingly exacting, reflecting all the
policies embedded in the privilege .... 53
Apparently, the involuntary confession rule was, at the time of the
Jackson decision, virtually identical to the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. As such, it qualified as a "specific right" de-
serving rigorous protection, whereas the right involved in Spencer,
predicated on general fairness, was accorded a lesser degree of protec-
tion.
C. Specific Rights Standards v. General Fairness Standards
In Griffin v. California,5 4 the trial judge had allowed the prose-
cutor in a murder trial to comment to the jury on the defendant's
failure to take the stand and had instructed the jury that a reasonable
inference could be drawn from the defendant's silence concerning facts
that he could be expected to know. The Supreme Court found this
procedure unconstitutional. In Delli Paoli v. United States,55 the Court
reviewed a joint trial at which an allegedly prejudicial procedure had
been used. The trial court admitted into evidence a confession of one
49 Id. at 7. The shift to the federal standard in state cases represented a change in
emphasis from brutality to involuntariness. See 78 HAav. L. REv. 223, 224 (1964).
50 378 U.S. at 7.
51 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
52 Malloy involved not a confession but rather potentially incriminating statements
before a court-appointed referee. Thus, the Court's language concerning confession cases
may be seen as dictum.
53 384 U.S. at 464 (emphasis added).
54 380 U.S. 609 (1965), rehearing denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965).
55 352 U.S. 232 (1957). Delli Paoli concerned a federal trial court procedure, but
since it was held valid, a similar state court procedure should also be valid. See p. 344 &
note 36 supra.
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of the petitioner's co-conspirators which had clear references to the pe-
titioner, thereby implicating him in the crime. Although the court
could have deleted the reference to the petitioner, it merely instructed
that the confession was to be used only in reference to the party making
it. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
Analysis of these two cases and of the procedures involved does
not reveal measurable differences in the prejudice to the defendant
that would explain the opposite results. The defendant is not put at a
significantly greater disadvantage by comment on his failure to testify
than by the implications of his co-defendant's confession. The differ-
ence in results apparently reflects the nature of the right involved in
each case.
The procedure at issue in Griffin-the comment by the prosecutor
and the instruction by the court permitting the inference-infringed
the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a
specific right made applicable to the states by Malloy v. Hogan.56 In
Delli Paoli no specific right was involved.57 As in Spencer, simple and
nonprejudicial alternative procedures were available; separate trials
could have been ordered, or the reference to the petitioner in the con-
fession could have been deleted. But the Court upheld the procedures
used, expressing confidence in the measures taken to diminish the prej-
udicial effects of the evidence.58
Similar differences in the Court's treatment of specific and general
rights are evident from analysis of other cases. Chandler v. Fretage9
began as a trial on a single larceny offense, to which the defendant
pleaded guilty. At the trial he was informed that he was being charged
as a habitual offender, and that conviction would result in a life sen-
tence. He asked for but was denied a continuance to procure counsel
for the recidivist hearing. The Supreme Court found this denial of
the right to counsel a violation of the defendant's fourteenth amend-
ment rights. In Williams v. New York, 60 the jury had returned a ver-
dict of guilty in a murder trial and recommended life imprisonment.
Nevertheless, the judge sentenced the defendant to death, basing his
decision on evidence not introduced at trial, namely, the defendant's
prior record and information from the probation department and
56 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
57 Since the Court was reviewing a federal trial, constitutional grounds were never
reached; the procedure was found valid under the federal supervisory powers of the
Supreme Court.
58 352 U.S. at 239-42.
59 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
60 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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other unnamed sources. The Court held that this denial of the oppor-
tunity to examine the adverse evidence or confront the adverse wit-
nesses was permissible.
It is difficult to distinguish these cases on the basis of the prejudice
resulting from the procedures used. In both instances, the prejudice
is substantial. Again, the results are different because of the nature of
the rights involved. Like Jackson, Chandler concerned a specific right
with a history of strict protection-namely, the due process "right to
counsel" akin to the sixth amendment right.61 On the other hand, the
right asserted in Williams-namely, to contest evidence used in the
sentencing process-was based on the general fairness requirement
inherent in fourteenth amendment due process.6 2
Apparently, when a specific right is involved, even a slightly
prejudicial procedure will induce the Court to protect the right by
overturning a conviction or by taking other appropriate action. Much
greater prejudice is needed when the general fairness requirement is
relied on. The fairness standard was defined by Justice Cardozo in the
following manner:
[A state] is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accor-
dance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless in so
doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental.63
In short, when "justice will be outraged,"64 due process is lacking.
The vagueness of the standard means, in practical terms, that general
fairness is lacking when a particular procedure shocks the consciences
of five Justices. In Spencer, Delli Paoli, and Williams the prejudice
was not sufficiently shocking to the Court to warrant reversal on due
process grounds, and, since specific rights were not at issue, the Court
allowed the prejudicial state procedures to stand.
61 Although the "right to counsel" in Chandler was based on fourteenth amendment
due process, the right was intimately related to the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), has since applied the sixth amendment right
to counsel to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See pp. 346-47 supra for an
analogous discussion concerning the privilege against self-incrimination.
62 Since this decision, the sixth amendment has been made applicable to the states.
Gideofn v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Nevertheless, the sixth amendment right to
confront witnesses applies to the trial of guilt, not to punishment hearings. For a discus-
sion of the different evidentiary and procedural limitations traditionally involved in guilt
determinations and punishment determinations, see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
246-47 (1949).
63 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
64 Id. at 115.
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How prejudicial must a state's practices be to fall below the gen-
eral fairness standards of -due process? Cases in which the Court has
found prejudice sufficient to violate general due process have involved
convictions based on perjured testimony,65 or on a. complete lack of
evidence, 66 or the televising of a sensational trial,67 or apparent bias
on the part of the trial judge.68 The prejudice must be truly out-
rageous before a conviction will be overturned. Although the preju-
dice in Spencer, Delli Paoli, and Williams might have been substantial
enough to justify protection of a specific right, it was not sufficiently
outrageous to violate the general fairness requirement. Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Spencer reflects the difference in standards.
Although he personally disapproved of the Texas procedure, he did
not find it sufficiently prejudicial to "fall below the minimum level
the Fourteenth Amendment will tolerate. 69
CONCLUSION
When no "specific" right is at issue, a state's procedure that re-
sults in significant but not outrageous prejudice to the criminal
defendant is not prohibited by the general fairness requirement of
the fourteenth amendment, even though the same procedure would
be struck down if a specific right were involved. It is no justification
to say that those specific rights explicitly written in the Constitution
deserve stricter protection. Indeed, Jackson demonstrates that many
of the specific rights are unwritten.
The distinction may be explained in terms of federalism. Perhaps
the Court is reluctant to dictate to the states the procedures that should
be used in the administration of criminal justice, preferring to let the
states experiment in areas that require no special uniformity. But this
seems to pervert the federal scheme; the very limits placed expressly
on the federal government-the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments
-now apply more strictly to the states than does the fourteenth
amendment, the one direct limit on the states.
A more convincing explanation is that the specific rights are
simply more sacred than the general fairness right. But results such
as those in Jackson and Spencer-where the jury is not permitted to
consider the voluntariness of a confession together with the question
65 Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294, U.S. 103 (1935).
66 Garner V. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960).
67 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
68 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
69 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967) (concurring opinion).
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of guilt but is allowed to consider prior convictions together with
guilt-cast doubt on the validity of the distinction. Talk of sanctity
seems hollow when the prejudice involved is of similar magnitude.
The difference in treatment might be easier to accept if the minimum
standards of fairness were somewhat higher-high enough, at least,
to preclude procedures such as those in Spencer.
Anthony M. Radice
